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Voice over internet protocol (VoIP) is being widely used, while the integration of voice and data provide 
several opportunities. Lower cost and more flexibility are the main advantages of the VoIP which 
derived the attention of the enterprises to it. Unfortunately in the other extreme, some security issues 
may come across with the extensive use of VoIP. The purpose of this review paper is to encourage the 
VoIP industry to consider the importance of the security matters of their application and to find the 
gaps by discussing the pros and cons of each application and performing the fair comparison. This 
article begins by discussing the motivation of security measures in VoIP applications and a list of 
possible threats such as denial-of-service (DoS), Call Hijacking and Interception. These security issues 
are the most well known attacks that can be carried out in current VoIP deployment. Next, we discuss 
about two VoIP applications, which are Skype and GTalk, and their security levels have been measured 
briefly by highlighting some of the security issues in them. These security measurements are used to 
perform the comparison between the studied VoIP applications. Finally some methods have been 
proposed to improve the security in the VoIP applications in future state.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Voice over internet protocol (VoIP) is being widely used, 
and is a new way of voice communication with public 
switched telephone networks (PSTN) and cellular 
networks. VoIP can be used to call any PSTN telephone 
or mobile phone anywhere in the world. Even though 
particular services can only work on a computer or a 
special VoIP phone, some allow a caller to use a 
conventional phone with an adapter. The goal of  VoIP  is 
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to replace the operating circuit-switched, public switching 
telecommunication network to a packet-switched 
network. VoIP has been successful in deriving the 
attention of the telecommunication markets of all sizes 
and introducing the advanced features to the market, 
while on the other side the integration of the voice and 
data words caused evident security risks. Lower cost and 
more flexibility are the main advantages of the VoIP 
which derived the attention of the enterprises to it. As a 
result, it is very important to consider cautiously all the 
security issues before installing VoIP. The purpose of this 
review paper is to encourage the VoIP industry to focus 
on security issues of their application and to find the gaps 
in this industry. The other important strength to come out 
with this paper was to give the technical comparison of 
the security measures of the VoIP applications to its end-
users, giving the ability to select the most applicable 
application. As a result, this article is prepared to study 
some of the security issues in VoIP which are the most 
well known attacks that can  be  carried  out  in  a  current  
  
 
 
 
 
VoIP deployment and to investigate those in two different 
VoIP applications.  
This article discusses the motivation of VoIP, highlights 
threats of VoIP, provides a comparison between different 
VoIP application securities and concludes the issues by 
proposing the idea to improve the security in VoIP 
applications. 
 
 
Motivation 
 
VoIP is a technology that allows a user to make a call 
using a computer over the internet instead of a standard 
telephony network. VoIP uses protocols such as real-time 
protocol (RTP) and H.323 to deliver packets over the 
internet (Cisco Systems, 2002). Each VoIP packet has an 
internet protocol (IP)/UDP/RTP header with a total size 
header, 40 bytes. G.711 and G.729 are the two widely 
used voice encoding standards that are used with VoIP 
products. G.711 limits the size of voice payload to 160 
bytes (20 ms of voice) or 240 bytes (30 ms of voice) at a 
bit rate of 64 Kbps. A large voice payload size would 
increase the encoding latency. G.729 limits the voice 
payload size to 20 bytes or 30 bytes only (Cisco 
Systems, 2006).  
VoIP is a new service which comes in order to improve 
the legacy voice communication by supporting it with data 
communication as well. VoIP allows data, images and 
videos to be transmitted simultaneously (Hens and 
Caballero, 2008). There are many advantages and 
benefits (Park, 2009; Raake and Corporation, 2006) that 
can be gained from VoIP like: 
 
• Cost savings: Reduce the communication cost for the 
users which means that the communication can be done 
over private or internet data network line, instead of 
commercial telecommunications line.   
• Extendibility: VoIP can be extended easily to any 
number of users and without any geographical boundary 
limitation. 
• The available resources can be reused: Available 
network can be used for VoIP implementation. 
• Data and voice service are combined easily: Rich 
media of services. 
• Easy implementation: Speech communications can be 
designed by computer networks companies within any 
organization. 
• Collaboration and integration with other applications: 
This is because some protocols can collaborate with 
other applications easily, so it can take benefits from its 
properties. 
• Mobility of the service: Thus, the users can use the 
services from anywhere like voice mail, call features and 
so on. 
• User control interface: Thus, most of VoIP have  
user controls interface or graphical user interface (GUI)  
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like in web, which make it easy to use. 
• Phone portability: Thus, the users do not need to 
change the communication details where ever they go or 
move 
 
VoIP nowadays is very common for many people who are 
using IP phones or using client software like Messengers 
(MSN, Yahoo, Skype, Google Talk, and many more). 
This popularity of VoIP comes from the services that can 
be gained by end user. In addition to voice, the users can 
have video conferencing, instant chat messaging, and fax 
data over the IP network. Figure 1 shows a conceptual 
view about VoIP service architecture (Park, 2009). In this 
Figure 1, the architecture demonstrates three types of 
networks; a service provider network, a consumer 
network and an enterprise network which are all 
connected to PSTN through a media gateway. In 
consumer network, a digital subscriber line (DSL) router 
receives connection from the VoIP servers which exist in 
the service provider network. This network provides 
voice, video, presence, instant messaging (IM) and 
internet phone services to its consumers. In the 
enterprise network, the VoIP servers are connected to a 
call manager in its center, which provide the services 
such as the voice using IP phones, video, fax, enterprise 
IM and presence. 
Considering all the advantages of VoIP, bringing 
together voice and data on the same wire, in spite of the 
protocols used, employ network security problems. One 
of the outcomes of this integration could happen when 
there is a major attack in the network. This event can 
cause the organization’s entire telecommunications 
infrastructure to be at risk. To secure the whole VoIP 
infrastructure, many studies shall be done to perform a 
proper planning and analysis, and to gain comprehensive 
information about the details of the implementation. 
 
 
Literature analysis 
 
Securing business private data is the most important 
thing that most of the commercial companies and 
institutions care about. It is because of the new risks 
accomplished with the new technologies (Porter and 
Gough, 2007). VoIP is a new technology which emerged 
since late 90s (Park, 2009). Although, this new 
technology was accomplished with many security risks; it 
is still considered more secure than a traditional 
telephone (e.g. PSTN) communication (Thermos, 2006). 
Merging voice with data to be transmitted in data network 
by using IP as an identifier is considered as an attractive 
area of research which is the basis of VoIP. In order to 
establish this communication many protocols are used. 
Each of these protocols has its own properties; which 
make the area of attack wider. 
Many businesses nowadays are migrating from the 
legacy traditional enterprise telephone PSTN to VoIP; 
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Figure 1. VoIP service architecture (Park, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Analogue phone versus IP phone (Hens and Caballero, 2008). 
 
 
 
because of the benefits that can be gained by combining  
both voice and data together (Wallingford, 2005). It has 
emerged since late 90s to be one of the 
telecommunication media in the world (Park, 2009). 
Figure 2 shows the normal analogue phone (a) and IP 
phone (b) models, respectively (Hens and Caballero, 
2008).  
 
 
Threats to VoIP communication systems 
 
Thermos (2006) addresses in his article that some VoIP 
service providers confuse what security means in packet 
based communications. While, VoIP service provider in 
North America claims that "We are more secure than a 
regular phone line". The article also discusses two main 
common attacks in VoIP deployments which focusing in 
signaling initiation protocol (SIP) such as: 
 
• The ability of the attacker to hijack a VoIP 
communications. 
• The ability of the attacker to eavesdropping VoIP 
communications.  
 
There are many works that have been discussed on VoIP 
threats since VoIP implementation. Porter and Gough 
(2007) also summarise and categorise different types of 
risks and threats in their article. Dantu et al. (2009) also 
presented a brief study of attacks on a VoIP 
infrastructure. They classified attacks into five primary 
types; this article is a good survey on the previous 
studies which have been done on VoIP attacks and its 
responses to give the broad perspective about the topic.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) (Dantu et al., 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. ARP spoofing (cache poisoning) (Dantu et al., 2009). 
 
 
 
Also they have discussed the solutions to overcome 
every one of the attacks, and finally they proposed the 
new infrastructure for the VoIP security to overcome 
some of the security issues. For selecting the best VoIP  
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application, implementation of security is an important 
factor to be studied. In his work on threats to VoIP 
communication systems, Porter (2006) states four types 
of threat which occur more than the others in VoIP 
applications, 
 
 
Denial-of-service (DoS) or VoIP service disruption 
 
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks can affect any IP-based 
network service, and are the most challenging treat in 
VoIP applications. One type of attack in which packets 
can simply be flooded into or at the target network from 
multiple external sources is called a distributed denial-of-
service (DDoS) attack. Porter (2006) shows its 
architecture in Figure 3. Dantu et al. (2009) in his study 
on VoIP attacks and responses proposed using Firewalls, 
special purpose hardware, VoIP aware hardware, 
effective authentication systems and recovery systems to 
overcome this type of threat.  
 
 
Call hijacking and interception 
 
Call interception and eavesdropping are other major 
concern on VoIP networks which cause theft of 
information and services on VoIP networks (Benini and 
Sicari, 2008). The existence of this treat in VoIP 
applications is because of the deficiency or absence of 
authentication measures. This threat demonstrates the 
need for security services that enable entities to 
authenticate the originators of requests and to verify that 
the contents of the message and control streams have 
not been altered in transit (Porter, 2006). While address 
resolution protocol (ARP) is a fundamental Ethernet 
protocol. This article also states that ARP redirection, 
ARP spoofing, ARP hijacking, and ARP cache poisoning 
are related methods for disrupting the normal ARP 
process (Figure 4). 
 
 
H.323-specific attacks 
 
H.323 is signaling protocol in VoIP communications 
which is encoded according to ASN.1 PER encoding 
rules. The implementation of H.323 massage parser, 
rather than the encoding rules themselves cause 
vulnerabilities in H.323 suits (Porter, 2006). 
 
 
Signaling initiation protocol (SIP)-specific attacks 
 
SIP is an unstructured text-based protocol which suffers 
vulnerabilities according to its encoding format, because 
it is not possible to check all permutations of SIP 
messages throughout development for security 
vulnerabilities. Since SIP protocol links other protocols 
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Figure 5. VoIP architecture level (Dantu et al., 2009). 
 
 
 
and services together, it may cause other typical 
vulnerabilities in services such as SSL, hypertext transfer 
protocol (HTTP), simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) to 
occur in VoIP environment (Porter, 2006) 
 
 
Voice over internet protocol (VoIP) security 
architecture 
 
Dantu et al. (2009) visualizes the VoIP infrastructure in 
three layers: end user equipment, network components, 
and a gateway to the traditional telephone network 
(Figure 5). This article defines each of these layers as 
follows; the first layer is the end user equipment which 
provides the interface for users to communicate with 
other end users. It can be hard phones (conventional 
telephones) or soft phones (software that model the 
telephone). The securities of this end user equipment are 
related to the method of its installation. While this end 
user equipment are mostly used in property networks, at 
home or in hotels, they have provided with very less 
security characteristics making them vulnerable to any 
threats. The second layer is the network components. 
The existence of any vulnerability in this layer, cause the 
IP network to adopt the vulnerability. The idea is to 
measure the security of the network components, before 
installing the VoIP application, and to install it in the most 
secure location in between the network components. The 
IP network components, including routers, switches, and 
firewalls, must also be VoIP aware to provide security 
features specific to VoIP. 
The third layer is the VoIP gateways. The use of this 
layer is critical to assimilate IP network with the PSTN. As 
a result, applying the high security in this layer is 
necessary to avoid vulnerabilities. The main task of the 
gateway is voice compression or decompression, 
signalling control, call routing, and packetization. VoIP 
gateways interface with external controllers such as 
session initiation protocol (SIP) proxies, H434 
gatekeepers, media gateway controllers (MGCs), network 
management systems, and billing systems. These are 
exactly the places where the malicious attackers can 
intrude to the system in the way to hijack a user's VoIP 
subscription and subsequent communications. The 
security should be implemented in the gateway to avoid 
these kinds of attacks immediately and powerfully. 
Security issues encountering in VoIP are rare and, 
mostly, rather complicated.  
 
 
Soft phone security 
 
The extensive popularity of the VoIP and its low cost 
brought its attention to so many principal Web service 
firms. Skype, one of the first firms to capitalize on VoIP, 
provides a point-to-point Internet telephony network. The 
Skype communications system is famous because of its 
wide range of attributes, including free voice and video 
conferencing. Skype is closed-code software and this can 
cause many problems for its security features. Yahoo and 
Google also have the same applications that allow users 
to make calls for a low cost. Lately, Microsoft unveiled its  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Skype architecture (Porter, 2006). 
 
 
 
Office Communicator 2007, a unified communications 
client with a VoIP soft phone and Web, audio, and video 
conferencing. The soft phones are application software 
installed in computer which can have full access to all 
information in system, as a result the intruder can benefit 
from the right of the user who run the soft phone. The 
user with administrative rights can provide the soft phone 
application the right to use key system information.  
 
 
PSTN-VoIP internetworking 
 
There are many differences in technical assignments of 
the VoIP and PSTN, and their internetworking has 
extensive varying infrastructures and protocol, however in 
the third layer of the VoIP architecture they need to work 
together. The differences in protocols, trader operations, 
the delivery service used, and the service offered cause 
interoperability problems. These interoperability issues 
need to be addressed at every interconnection point of 
the network components. Ong et al. (1999) firstly 
introduced the signaling transport protocol (SIGTRAN), 
which was the protocol suite proposed by the internet 
engineering task force (IETF), as a solution to 
interoperability issues. This suite allows any subscriber in 
either network to transparently call a subscriber in 
another network. Unfortunately, this internetworking 
makes the infrastructure more vulnerable to attacks. Most 
current research assumes that the PSTN network is 
already secure and focuses on securing the IP network. 
The internetworking of VoIP  and  PSTN, however, poses  
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new threats to the traditional PSTN network. Thus, 
system administrators must take great care when 
plugging security gaps created by the internetworking of 
VoIP and PSTN. 
 
 
Comparison between different VoIP application 
securities 
 
VoIP in skype 
 
Skype is one of the most popular VoIP applications that 
emphasise mostly in a voice communication in addition to 
a standard instant messaging such as text messages and 
file transfers. Skype was developed by Niklas Zennström 
and Janus Friis was the originators of KaZaa (one of the 
most popular peer-to-peer services). Skype protects the 
transferred data by encrypting the media channel (Porter 
and Gough, 2007; Wang, 2005). One of the main reasons 
for the popularity of Skype VoIP services is its unique set 
of features to protect privacy of VoIP calls such as strong 
encryption, proprietary protocols, unknown codecs, 
dynamic path selection, and the constant packet rate 
(Zhu and Fu, 2010). However, some of enterprise 
security groups consider it as threat because it has to 
skip firewall in order to make call traffic. It supports call 
quality when establishing a connection with other Skype 
user. In addition, Skype got the ability to connect to any 
phone in PSTN (Porter and Gough, 2007; Hoßfeld and 
Binzenhöfer, 2008). The Skype user can communicate 
with anyone anywhere in the world, with either another 
Skype client or anyone with a phone. 
 
 
Skype architecture 
 
Skype architecture is not a very precise peer-to-peer 
network as long as it uses a centralized server which 
helps the system sign up new users as well as 
authenticates existing users with user ID and password 
information. There are three main types of computers 
used within the Skype service: a standard node, a super 
node, and a Skype server (Figure 6). The standard node 
is any workstation that has the Skype client software 
installed. The users are able to make and receive calls, 
send messages, and use all functionalities of the Skype 
through this workstation. The super nodes are similar in 
appearance and functionality to the end user, but these 
workstations have been chosen by the Skype service to 
handle much of the Skype system’s work. If a workstation 
has a publicly addressable IP address and extra 
bandwidth, it is capable of becoming a super node, and 
the end user has no control over whether their 
workstation is a super node or not. These super nodes do 
the heavy lifting for the Skype service, and the service 
relies on these super nodes, not a centralized  server, for  
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keeping track of other users in a directory (known as the 
Global index) and data from regular nodes. Workstations 
that are behind a firewall or a network address translation 
(NAT) gateway will never be eligible to become a super 
node, the reason is the IP address of the workstation is 
not public (Porter, 2006).  
Because the communications including text, voice, and 
files may be sent to other terminals before reaching the 
anticipated receiver, it is crucial to encrypt these 
communications to make sure users whose terminals 
have access to this information are not able to detect on 
the information that is exchanged. The encrypted session 
just begins before messaging starts and two clients have 
established that they wish to transfer information between 
each other. All data that is sent and received between 
two clients is encrypted using 256-bit encryption based 
on the advanced encryption standard (AES). The key for 
this exchange is unique to that particular sessions and 
that particular set of terminals exchanging information. 
Once the session has been terminated, the key is no 
longer valid (Porter, 2006).  
The encrypted data which is transferred during Skype 
communication prevents users against transit data 
modification, eavesdropping, impersonation, man-in-the-
middle attacks (Skype.com, 2011). It uses proprietary 
protocols which provide and incorporate heavy encryption 
(Slay and Simon, 2008). There is several security policies 
applied in Skype in order to guarantee the security 
requirements. These policies as they were addressed by 
(Berson, 2005) are:- 
 
• The usernames in Skype are unique. 
• Users must provide username and password before 
they can get the account privileges. 
• Only one session can be established at a time, so the 
same account cannot open twice at a time. 
• The end to end Skype session communications are 
encrypted, and without any intermediary node. 
 
 
VoIP in Google Talk 
 
Google Talk is another VoIP applications offered by 
Google Inc., which is only available for windows platform, 
but it can be used in other platform by using internet 
browsers. It provides the basic services like data 
communication voice mail, chat, file transfer and etc. The 
Google Talk client was a huge step forward for Google as 
a means of trying in communications with its wide suite of 
applications. Using the widely popular jabber protocol 
Google Talk is one of the few open-standard chat 
services around. It allows connecting through stand alone 
client, Google mail, or many of Google’s other web-based 
applications (Baskin and Brashars, 2006). In terms of the 
VoIP application, there is not any connection to PSTN 
with Google Talk, so it has some limitations which can be  
 
 
 
 
considered as a disadvantage (Ahmed and Shaon, 
2009). In addition, it does not provide any kind of 
encryption in the end to end communication, which 
makes it exhibit for attacks like eavesdropping attacks 
(Ahmed and Shaon, 2009; Slay and Simon, 2008). 
 
 
Google talk architecture  
 
Google has announced that a major goal of the Google 
Talk service is interoperability. Google Talk uses Jabber 
and extensible messaging and presence protocol (XMPP) 
to provide real-time extensible messaging and presence 
events, including offline messaging (though only through 
non-Google clients like Adium). Google Talk now 
supports federation with other Jabber servers, allowing 
any one to send and receive IMs to other Jabber users 
with non-Google Talk accounts (Hester, 2009). On 
December 15th 2005, Google released libjingle, a C++ 
library to implement Jingle, “a set of extensions to the 
IETF’s XMPP for use in VoIP, video and other peer-to-
peer multimedia sessions.” Google Talk does not encrypt 
the Jabber stream, instead using an undocumented non 
standard way of authenticating to the service, retrieving a 
token from a secure web server. Other clients than 
Google’s own are required to secure their streams with 
transport layer security (TLS) before sending the 
password, causing them to stay encrypted throughout the 
whole session. Google claims that all messages (text and 
voice) will be encrypted in future releases (Hester, 2009). 
One of the main reasons to use XMPP channel is for 
placing the calls. The user is already authenticated in 
GMail and Google Talk. So the request is sent through 
the authenticated XMPP network to their XMPP 
component responsible to offer SIP gateway. Since then 
the component will convert the jingle signaling from the 
Google Talk to SIP and use the person’s Google 
credentials to authenticate in their SIP services in the 
backend and stream RTP with standard codecs directly 
from the browser (Camargo, 2010). The Google’s future 
plan is to be able to delivery mass market a cheap and 
alternative method for calling the old fashioned telephone 
numbers. This is possible while Google talk is pre 
installed in most of the Android phones in the market, 
while they are using the same Jingle extension of XMPP 
for their service, (Camargo, 2010). Figure 7 shows the 
architecture of Google Talk security. 
 
 
Skype versus Google Talk  
 
Garfinkel (2005) argued that “security is not some 
abstract quality that can be analyzed in isolation”. As a 
result to measure the security of the VoIP applications, it 
is essential to study the particular threats and also to 
verify if the design or operation of that VoIP application is  
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Figure 7. Google Talk architecture (Camargo, 2010). 
 
 
 
Table 1. Comparsion table. 
 
Security feature Skype Google talk 
Privacy 
The broadcasted Messages are encrypted from 
Skype-end to Skype-end. In case of any 
intermediary node, the meaning of the massages 
will remain secret, and no one can reach to it. 
In Google Talk the encryption is not end to end making the 
entire voice data susceptible of eavesdrop attacks however 
the connection between the client and the Google Talk 
server is encrypted. Mail notifications, Friends list, personal 
settings and messages of others between a client and the 
Google server can’t be seen by others.  
Authenticity 
User names are distinctive while users or 
applications have to enter a Skype username and 
its selected authentication code such as 
password. Only after the authentication the 
session will permit transmit messages such as 
voice, video, files, or text. 
User names are distinctive but in Google Talk the user can 
use the same authentication password and username for 
Gmail and Google Talk, and other Google applications. Also 
it supports inter-operability; the user in Google Talk can 
communicate with the users in other services. 
Availability 
Since the Skype requires the authentication 
password and username, whole its network may 
stop to work if its authentication servers break 
down or become unavailable.  
Since Google Talk also requires the authentication 
password and username, whole its network may stop to 
work if its authentication servers break down or become 
unavailable. 
Survivability Skype's authentication servers can’t survive 
network disruptions or attacks 
Google Talk’s authentication servers also can’t survive 
network disruptions or attacks 
Resilience  It is generally very resilient to local network disruption Google Talk is also very resilient to local network disruption 
Integrity 
(Conversation) 
There is no guarantee that the files will be 
delivered completely as transmitted. 
There is also no guarantee that the files will be delivered 
completely as transmitted, but the risk is higher. 
Integrity (System) 
Skype uses a high limit of bandwidth; it may 
cause security vulnerabilities to other parts of the 
system, for example it could be an infection vector 
for spyware. It has no built in anti-virus protection. 
Google Talk uses a less limit of bandwidth; Google Talk 
may cause vulnerabilities to the system due to remote 
HTML-injection vulnerability because it has also no built in 
anti-virus protection. 
 
 
 
secured from those threats. Garfinkel (2005) also 
introduced security features such as privacy, authenticity, 
availability, survivability, resilience, conversation integrity 
and system integrity as important keys to be measured in 
VoIP applications. Table 1 demonstrates the comparison 
between the Skype and Google Talk as two most popular  
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types of VoIP applications as mentioned in the security 
features above. Skype has been improved its peer-to-
peer voice service for the last seven years, while Google 
voice is started recently well-built. Google's 
communications service may offer a different set of tools, 
but its rich features and brand reputation are derived the 
attention of the VoIP enterprises. Skype is sure to feel the 
pressure of the competition after Google has introduced 
its new adventure by integrating Google Voice with Gmail 
in-box. Although Google Talk is in low-development 
stages, many users are connected to the service 
because they like the simple way for chatting provided by 
Google Talk. In general Google Talk is more enterprise-
oriented than Skype, requires less bandwidth and adopt 
collaborative features that work well with the 
implementation of Google Applications in business 
communication services and integrates with the 
company’s active directory through third-party tools, to 
name just a few advantages, however it has more place 
to improve its security and does not provide end to end 
voice encryption making the whole voice data susceptible 
to eavesdrop attacks. Skype, in the other 
extreme, provides interesting features that Google Talk 
does not have at present, for instance the ability to 
establish a conference call with up to five people at a 
time and the ability to make phone calls to mobiles and 
landlines worldwide at low rates. However, this software 
requires more bandwidth than Google Talk and it is not 
favorable to be used as a means of communication in 
business communication services. In contrast to Google 
Talk which is only available for Windows, Skype is now 
available for Widows, Linux, Mac OS, Widows mobile and 
some Nokia series platform. However, the main problem 
with Skype is its proprietary protocol, which bars users to 
send and receive calls to other VoIP services (Ahmed 
and Shaon, 2009). 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This article discusses the VoIP application security. The 
previous studies have shown that using VoIP increases 
the vulnerability of the network, as a result so many 
efforts has been done to overcome this problem, and to 
make it as less as possible. However, the low cost of the 
VoIP encouraged enterprises to produce many different 
applications that facilitate this technology, in distinct 
characteristics. As a result, security issues should be one 
of the most important things that should be taken 
seriously during selecting the appropriate VoIP 
application to be used. In this article, we studied the 
architecture of the VoIP and its protocols, and the 
security issues regarding to each level, to come with a 
good understanding of the security condition of the VoIP 
applications in the market. Finally, two different models of 
the VoIP application, Skype and Google Talk have been 
compared together, to find out which application is more  
 
 
 
 
reliable in terms of security. The result of comparison 
shows that Google Talk is more enterprise-oriented than 
Skype and it is open to improve its security. Skype, on 
the other hand, provides interesting features that Google 
Talk does not have at present, for instance the ability to 
establish a conference call with up to five people at a 
time and the ability to make the phone calls to mobiles 
and landlines worldwide at low rates. However, this 
software requires more bandwidth than Google Talk and 
it is not favorable to be used as a means of 
communication in business communication services.  
In summary, we can see that Skype is more secure in 
VoIP application but it does not offer interoperability. On 
the other hand, Google Talk has interoperability but with 
less level of security. It is one of the areas of the future 
study which fills the gap between the interoperability and 
security and designs the new VoIP application which 
offers interoperability without side tracking the security. In 
addition to that, security enhancement is an important 
factor to be considered such as a built-in antivirus 
protection, VoIP-aware firewalls and VoIP anomaly 
detection systems. In a future work, the authors might 
also want to consider about improving the state of the 
message encryption to prevent the call hijacking and 
eavesdropping attacks. 
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